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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DAVID ANDREW MOOSMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 870251 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of a capital felony, a 
first degree felony and a second degree felony in a single 
prosecution in the First District Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant waived his right to a jury trial 
based upon the supplemental record. 
2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 
convictions after a bench trial. 
3. Whether defendant was denied confrontation when the 
State Medical Examiner who supervised the autopsy testified about 
the autopsy findings instead of the Assistant Medical Examiner 
who actually performed the autopsy. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
All applicable provisions are completely set forth 
within the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with first degree murder, a 
capital felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(f) 
(1978); communications fraud, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(e) (1978); and making a false 
or fraudulent insurance claim, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-412(1)(a)(i) and 76-6-521 
(1978). Defendant was bound over after a preliminary hearing on 
all three counts on December 1, 1986. 
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, sitting without a 
jury, tried defendant on June 1, 1987 through June 16, 1987 (R. 
88-107). Judge Christoffersen found defendant guilty of all 
three counts (T. 1652). On June 29, 1987, Judge Christoffersen 
sentenced defendant to life in prison for first degree murder, a 
prison term of one to fifteen years for making a false or 
fraudulent insurance claim, and a prison term of five years to 
life for communications fraud (R. 109). All sentences are 
concurrent (R. 110). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on July 17, 1987 (R. 
115). The record on appeal was received in this Court on October 
27, 1987. Defendant's Brief was filed on January 6, 1989. 
On March 6, 1989, this Court granted the State's motion 
to remand the case to the trial court to supplement the record 
under R. Utah S. Ct. 11(h) after defendant filed his brief 
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claiming, inter alia, that he had not personally waived a jury 
trial (R. 134). On October 23, 1989, Judge Christoffersen found 
that defendant had personally waived the jury prior to trial (R. 
146). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tamara Moosman died on September 14, 1985 (T. 437, 
447). Her husband, the defendant, drove their truck with Mrs. 
Moosman in the passenger seat that evening through Logan Canyon 
on their way back to Logan from Bear Lake (T. 603, 1425; P.H.T. 
517-518, 524). At about 8:30 p.m., the truck left the roadway, 
vaulted through the air and travelled 285 feet down the slope, 
rolling one and three quarter times before coming to rest on its 
driver's side in the river (P.H.T. 517; T. 671, 899-900). 
Defendant exited the truck some time before it reached the bottom 
of the hillside and Mrs. Moosman continued down inside the truck 
to the bottom (P.H.T. 519). Her lifeless body was found floating 
face down in the river by rescuers (T. 399-401). 
During the summer prior to Tamara's death, the couple 
had marital difficulties (T. 1447-48). They fought, and 
defendant gave her at least one black eye soon before her death 
(T. 56-7, 190-91, 203-06, 234, 248, 267, 273-74, 304, 1451). 
Tamara consulted with coworkers, religious leaders and an 
attorney about a document defendant authored and asked her to 
sign (T. 185-86, 192, 235-36, 248, 268, 286, 306, 311-12). This 
All references to P.H.T. pages are to the transcript of a taped 
interview with defendant that was reported at preliminary 
hearing. This transcript was used at trial when the tape was 
played as a guide for the parties to follow (see T. 603). 
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document was an agreement that Tamara would give defendant 
custody of their two children and give him all of their property 
if she ever sought a divorce from defendant (Ex. 14). She was 
upset about the document and appeared to some to be afraid (T. 
195, 235-36, 249, 301-09). To coerce Tamara to sign this 
document, defendant threatened to resign his teaching job and 
drafted a letter of resignation (T. 185-86, 1420). This letter 
was inside the glove compartment of the truck on the night Tamara 
died (T. 533). 
In the months prior to Tamara's death defendant told 
his coffee buddy, Terry Carlsen, about several different ways 
that he might kill Tamara so that it would appear to be either an 
accident or the act of some other person (T. 29-33). Defendant 
told Carlsen that he had insurance on Tamara's life and that 
would provide him money to purchase property he wanted (T. 23-
4). Defendant took out a term life insurance policy on Tamara's 
life and a whole life policy on his own life in January, 1985 
each worth $100,000 (T. 125, 136). 
On the night Tamara died, defendant said he did not 
know what happened but that the truck went off of the road and 
that he was thrown clear before it reached the river (T. 1425; 
P.H.T. 519). He said that he went down to the truck, helped 
Tamara climb out of the back window, helped her to the riverbank, 
and then left to get help (P.H.T. 522-23; T. 1426-28). He 
claimed that Tamara appeared shaken but all right; that there was 
no blood or injuries and that he got no blood on his clothes from 
helping her to the bank (P.H.T. 526, 532; T. 1429, 1489). He 
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said that it took him from the time of the accident at 8:30 p.m. 
until the time he was discovered at the side of the road about 
11:15 p.m. to climb up to the road (T. 393-94; P.H.T. 524, 527-
29). 
The medical examiner testified that Tamara died from 
drowning (T. 1021-22). She had several lacerations on her scalp 
that were caused by a blunt instrument but that were inconsistent 
with anything inside the truck (T. 1012, 1023, 1030, 1052, 1073-
74, 1097-98, 1100). These wounds would have bled profusely and 
immediately (T. 1023-24, 1257, 1323-24, 1358) and were consistent 
with having been caused by significant forcie with a piece of 
p.v.c. pipe found at the scene (T. 1031). No blood was found 
inside of the truck where one would expect to find blood if the 
injuries had occurred within the truck (T. 867-72, 1360-61, 
1368). There were seatbelt striations on Tamara's chest and 
abdomen indicating that she wore her seatbelt (T. 852, 1262, 
1314). Studies of the water flow indicated that Tamara's body 
probably floated from a point near the windshield of the truck 
rather than the back of the truck or the bank where defendant 
claimed he left her, to the point where it was found (T. 785-
815). These facts support the inference that defendant struck 
her on the head after she exited or while she was exiting the 
truck and that she then floated downstreanj. 
Defendant said that he did not know what caused him to 
go off the road. He saw no obstacles and was not aware that he 
fell asleep, nor was he drowsy prior to that time (T. 1483, 
P.H.T. 535). The mark left on the road indicated that the brakes 
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were not applied and that the truck had made a sudden 29 degree 
turn from the roadway (T. 669-70, 740, 757). The evidence was 
consistent with the driver having made an intentional turn from 
left to right and off of the roadway (T. 678). As the truck left 
the shoulder of the road, the tire marks indicated that the 
driver had either corrected the turn back to straight or had 
simply let go of the wheel (T. 716-19). It was possible for the 
driver to exit the truck as it left the roadway (T. 692-93). 
Defendant suffered no serious injuries (T. 440-41, 
479). He was conscious when emergency personnel arrived and had 
no physical symptoms of shock although he laid at the side of the 
road as if he were in shock (T. 440-42). When he was transported 
to a hospital, he refused any treatment, including having his 
vital signs checked (T. 478-79, 494H). 
Emergency personnel who worked with defendant that 
night questioned whether his reaction to his wife's death was 
normal (T. 488-91, 496). Defendant made several statements that 
he had killed his wife even though people kept telling him that 
accidents happen (T. 455, 483, 494J-495, 530). He also stated 
that he had once threatened to kill her if she left him and took 
the children and "I don't know if I should be answering this, 
because if it was just me I'd plead guilty to anything you want, 
but I've got those damn kids to think about." (T. 1529, ex. 16). 
After Tamara's death, defendant filed a claim for 
insurance benefits claiming that her death was accidental (T. 
138-39, 145-47, 177-180). He expressed frustration that the 
insurance companies did not pay him as quickly as he wanted and 
demanded immediate payment (T. 140, 144, 178, 1537, ex. 4). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant waived his right to a jury in chambers 
immediately prior to trial. His claim that he did not is 
meritless given the supplemented record. 
Defendant's claim that the evidence is insufficient is 
not supported by citation to the record for the claimed 
insufficiencies. In fact, defendant fails to point to the 
evidence supporting his convictions and his arguments should not, 
therefore, be entertained. In any event, the evidence is not 
lacking in the areas defendant attacks. 
Defendant's claim that he was denied confrontation of 
the doctor who performed the autopsy is meritless. The medical 
examiner who testified actually supervised the autopsy and was 
responsible for the report and actually signed the report even 
though a training physician actually performed the procedure. 
Defendant was not precluded from calling this person himself. 
Furthermore, defendant was able to present his theory of the case 




DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. 
The District Court Judge tried defendant without a jury 
in this case. The case was originally scheduled for a jury trial 
i i 
(R. 61). On appeal, defendant claimed that he did not waive his 
right to a jury trial and was entitled to a new trial. This 
Court remanded the case to the trial court to supplement the 
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record on the issue of whether defendant had waived the jury at 
the time of trial. 
Judge Christoffersen, the trial judge, heard the 
State's motion to correct the record under R. Utah S. Ct. 11(h) 
and on October 23, 1989 entered findings to correct the record to 
conform with what actually occurred. (Copy in Appendix A.) The 
record now discloses that defendant personally waived his right 
to a jury trial in chambers immediately before the start of the 
bench trial (R. 146). Defendant knew he had a right to a jury 
trial and had discussed the decision to waive the jury with 
defense counsel (R. 146). Defendant stated that he fully 
understood what his waiver meant and still wished to waive the 
jury (R. 14 6 p. 2). The State agreed to the waiver and the court 
consented (Ld.). 
In State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986), this Court 
held that where no waiver of a jury occurs in open court or on 
the record, waiver of a jury will not be presumed from a silent 
record. The record in this case is not silent. With the record 
now clear that defendant did in fact voluntarily waive the jury 
defendant's claim is meritless. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS OF ALL THREE COUNTS. 
Defendant asserts that the evidence on all three counts 
was insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, he 
urges that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
he murdered his wife. Consequently, he further urges that the 
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communications fraud and false or fraudulent insurance claim 
should also fail because he cannot be guilty of either of these 
offenses if he is not guilty of murder. 
This was a bench trial. This Court reviews the verdict 
of a Judge in a criminal case under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1987). 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987). Rule 52(a) 
requires this Court to affirm the verdict unless the findings of 
fact upon which it is based are clearly erroneous. Clearly 
erroneous findings are those that are against the clear weight of 
the evidence. Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. A defendant seeking 
review of his conviction under this standard is required to 
marshal all of the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that support for the findings is so lacking that they 
are against the clear weight of the evidence. In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant completely fails in his duty to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. In fact, 
defendant does not even acknowledge that any such evidence 
exists. His statement of the facts simply relates that his wife 
died as a result of an automobile accident in Logan Canyon, 
without any citation to the record whatsoever. See App. Br. at 
2-3. In the argument portion of his brief, defendant complains 
about three specific portions of the trial court's findings and 
asserts that the evidence at trial did not support these findings 
and that the evidence was actually contrary to the findings. 
Notably, however, defendant cites only to the trial court's 
findings and does not cite to any of the pages in the transcript 
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where the evidence pertaining to these findings may be found. 
Defendant's failure to acknowledge that evidence exists in the 
record supporting the trial court's findings should not be 
tolerated by this Court. State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 (Utah 
1985) (failure to cite to the record is grounds for affirmance, 
citing former Utah R. Civ.P. 75(p)(2)(2)(d)—current rule is R. 
Utah S. Ct. 24(a)(7) (1989)). 
Furthermore, a review of the record in light of 
defendant's specific claims reveals that the evidence supports 
the trial court's findings. First, defendant disputes the 
court's finding that the truck went off the road as the result of 
an "intentional part on the part of the driver of running the car 
off the road with the passenger in it with an escape route for 
himself" at a point which is "one of the most dangerous parts in 
Logan Canyon, at a point conveniently just past the guardrail, at 
a point where an exit could be made if you do it quickly enough 
just as the car turns, in which you might let go of the steering 
wheel just as the car turns, in which you might let go of the 
steering wheel just as it existed [sic] off the shoulder of the 
road . . . " (App. Br. at 8, quoting T. 1647). (Complete copy of 
court's findings in Appendix B). Defendant asserts that there 
was no evidence that the area was one of the most dangerous parts 
of the canyon or that the truck went off the road conveniently 
past the guardrail. There was evidence supporting both of these 
findings. 
Several photographs of the scene were admitted at 
trial. Among these were several photographs that showed where 
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the truck exited the road (Ex- 22, 23, 36, 37, 52, 53). In all 
of these, it is obvious that there is no guard rail where the 
truck exited the roadway. Exhibit 22 shows where the guardrail 
ended along the curve (offered T. 384-85, admitted T. 405). This 
photograph is a view of the scene looking uphill (T. 663-64). 
Exhibit 15 is a scale drawing produced by Robert Dahle, the 
accident reconstructionist, which shows that the guardrail ended 
uphill from the point where the truck exited the roadway (offered 
T. 670, admitted 756). Defendant himself identified on exhibit 
35 the location where the truck left the road and agreed that it 
was just past the guardrail (T. 1488, 1492). The photographs 
along with the testimony of the witnesses who identified them and 
the fact that the Judge visited the scene (T. 655-59) support the 
conclusion that the truck exited the road at a point that was 
conveniently beyond the end of the guardrail. That is, 
convenient if one were intentionally turning the truck off the 
road so that it would continue on down the hill rather than 
strike the railing. 
The Judge's finding that this is one of the most 
dangerous areas in the canyon is supported by Robert Dahle's 
testimony. Dahle testified that he is very familiar with Logan 
canyon and that the sharpest curve in the canyon is just east of 
the curve where the Moosman truck left the roadway (T. 686-87). 
Moreover, the Judge visited the scene himself and was capable of 
concluding from his own observation that the curve where the 
truck left the road was one of the most dangerous. 
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Next defendant complains that the court erred in its 
finding that the truck was travelling between 22 and 27 m.p.h. 
when it turned off of the road. App. Br. at 9. Defendant claims 
that the experts testified that the truck was travelling 37 
m.p.h. Jd. Defendant's assertion is not backed by any reference 
to the record and is easily refuted. 
Robert Dahle estimated that the truck was travelling 
between 22 and 27 m.p.h. at trial (T. 673). On cross 
examination, he admitted that his report initially gave the 
maximum speed as 27 to 30 m.p.h. (T. 722-24). He explained that 
the difference between the maximum of 27 and the maximum of 30 
was based upon which measurements were used but he felt that the 
difference was insignificant (I^*)* H e believed the speed was 
closer to 22 m.p.h. than 27 but that at any rate, it was less 
than 30 m.p.h. (T. 747). Defendant's own expert estimated the 
speed of the truck when it left the road at 28-30 m.p.h. (T. 
1162). Defendant's claim that the speed was 37 m.p.h. is 
specious. 
Defendant also claims that expert testimony does not 
support the court's conclusion that defendant jumped from the 
truck as he turned it off of the road. He asserts that 
defendant's reaction time and the laws of physics would have 
prevented him from opening the truck door and jumping out before 
the truck left the pavement. Robert Dahle testified that a 
person's reaction time is reduced when they are reacting to a 
preplanned maneuver (T. 755). According to Dahle, defendant 
would have had less than 2h seconds to eject and land above where 
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the truck initially touched down after it vaulted from the 
shoulder of the road (T. 750). As a comparison it was 
established that a minimum reaction time for beginning to brake 
after perceiving a reason to brake is three quarters of a second 
but may be realistically more like 1 to 1*5 seconds (T. 751). 
With a preplanned maneuver, this time could be reduced to as 
little as k of a second (T. 755). 
Dahle also testified about the ability of passengers to 
open the doors of the truck as it left the road. When the 
initial turn was started, the driver's door would be the easiest 
to open because of the weight shift toward the driver's side that 
would occur with the abrupt change of direction (T. 692-93). 
Once the truck landed after its initial flight from the shoulder, 
the driver's door would be most difficult to open because the 
weight would shift back (T. 693). It would also have been 
difficult to eject from this side due to the jostling of the 
truck as it rolled on down the rugged hillside (T. 691). There 
was no evidence presented that the door would have been 
impossible to open prior to the time that it touched down after 
vaulting off of the road as defendant claims. 
Finally, defendant complains that the State Medical 
Examiner did not have sufficient contact with the victim to 
determine the cause of death and that, therefore, he could not 
conclude that the wounds on Mrs. Moosman's scalp were caused by 
being struck with a blunt instrument rather than by striking some 
part of the truck during the rollover. App. Br. at 10. This 
allegation does not make sense. All three experts testified that 
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the scalp wounds were not fatal. Thus, Dr. Sweeney's ability to 
determine the cause of death does not affect his opinion as to 
the cause of the scalp wounds. Further, Dr. Sweeney personally 
viewed the scalp wounds prior to the autopsy and could view the 
photographs of the wounds to refresh his recollection of their 
appearance. His opinion that the wounds were not caused by any 
part of the truck was based upon his inspection of the truck and 
was corroborated by the lack of blood within the truck. All 
three doctors agreed that scalp wounds like these would bleed 
profusely. For these reasons, the trial court did not err by 
relying on Dr. Sweeney who had actually viewed the wounds at the 
time of the autopsy rather than upon Dr. Moore who had only 
reviewed the photographs and the autopsy report. 
None of defendant's allegations establish that his 
convictions should be overturned. The Judge's findings are not 
clearly erroneous because they are supported by the evidence 
rather than being against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Defendant's convictions on all three counts should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE STATE 
MEDICAL EXAMINER TO TESTIFY ABOUT THE CAUSE 
OF DEATH EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT PERSONALLY 
PERFORM THE AUTOPSY. 
The autopsy of Mrs. Moosman was performed by Dr. 
Salazar who was a fellow at the Utah State Medical Examiner's 
Office at the time (T. 1003). Dr. Salazar was supervised by Dr. 
Edward Sweeney, the Utah State Medical Examiner (T. 1005). Also 
present was a medical examiner assistant or clerk who performed 
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some of the autopsy procedures (T. 998, 1003, 1037). Dr. Sweeney 
directed and controlled the autopsy, though Salazar actually 
performed it and dictated the notes that were used to prepare the 
autopsy report (T. 999, 1001, 1003, 1005). Dr. Sweeney was 
present during the external examination of Mrs. Moosman, but 
could not recall how much of the internal examination he actually 
observed (T. 1001, 1029). He did personally observe the head 
wounds prior to an internal examination of the head (T. 1029). 
Dr. Salazar wrote the autopsy report but it was not final until 
Dr. Sweeney reviewed it and they had discussed the findings (T. 
1001). Dr. Sweeney was ultimately responsible for the report and 
actually signed the autopsy report (T. 1077). 
At trial, Dr. Sweeney testified about the autopsy 
findings. Dr. Salazar did not testify. Defendant objected to 
Dr. Sweeney's testimony claiming that it denied him confrontation 
because Dr. Salazar actually performed the autopsy. Defendant 
raises this same argument on appeal. His claim that he was 
denied confrontation because Dr. Sweeney testified is meritless. 
Utah R. Evid. 703 provides that 
[t]he facts or data in the particular case 
upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made 
known to him at or before the hearing. If of 
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
Thus, Dr. Sweeney could testify as an expert about the autopsy 
findings and the ultimate cause of death even though he did not 
perform the autopsy. State v. Clayton, $46 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 
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1982) (applying principle of federal rule 703, even though 
decided under former Utah Rule 56(2)(b)). 
It was within the trial court's discretion to determine 
the suitability of the expert testimony and the expert's 
qualifications. J^ i. Once Dr. Sweeney was qualified as an 
expert, defendant could challenge the credibility of his 
testimony by cross examination but that challenge went only to 
its weight, not its admissibility. Id. 
Thus, defendant's objection that Dr. Sweeney did not 
personally perform the autopsy procedures went to the weight of 
Dr. Sweeney's testimony and not its admissibility. Defendant was 
able to cross examine him about the fact that he either could not 
recall or had not personally observed certain of the procedures. 
Defendant confronted Dr. Sweeney, who was the State's witness, 
and was not prejudiced by Dr. Salazar's absence. Compare Diaz v. 
State, 728 P.2d 503, 514 (Okl. Cr. 1986) (Difficult to perceive 
prejudice where witness who was medical examiner's chief 
investigator and who observed autopsy testified about cause of 
death because defendant thoroughly cross examined about fact that 
witness was not a licensed physician or pathologist). 
Defendant's claim that he was denied confrontation 
misses the mark because the State did not prevent defendant from 
calling Dr. Salazar himself. In fact, defendant called his own 
expert witnesses, who also did not perform the autopsy, to 
testify about the validity of the autopsy findings. Defendant 
could as easily have called Dr. Salazar, but chose not to do so. 
He cannot claim that the State's decision to rely on Dr. Sweeney 
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as its expert denied him the opportunity to talk to Dr. Salazar 
because it is clear from the record that defendant knew that Dr. 
Salazar actually performed the autopsy (T. 999-1004). 
Indeed, defendant thoroughly cross examined Dr. Sweeney 
about the fact that he did not actually perform any of the 
autopsy procedures and was able to establish that Dr. Sweeney had 
no independent recollection of much of the autopsy without 
referring to the report. Dr. Moore testified for defendant that, 
in his opinion, the autopsy was not careful (T. 1243-44). He 
stated that he was unable to conclude from the autopsy report 
what caused Mrs. Moosman's death (T. 1275). He did not agree 
that the scalp wounds were caused by the p.v.c. pipe but 
concluded instead that they were caused by something inside the 
truck (T. 1247-48, 1300). Dr. Moore thought that several 
procedures that should have been done to establish the cause of 
death and rule out other possibilities were not performed (T. 
1273-74, 1279). Dr. Wallace also disputed whether the scalp 
wounds were caused by the p.v.c. pipe (T. 1317-18). Thus, 
defendant was able to present his theory of the case. 
In Dr. Salazar's absence, defendant's theory was more 
reasonable since Dr. Salazar might have explained many of the 
things that Dr. Moore questioned. Instead, the trial court was 
left with a credibility question due to the lack of any 
explanations. The fact that Judge Christoffersen ultimately 
chose to believe the medical examiner who had actually viewed 
Mrs. Moosman's body prior to the autopsy, and who had not 
questioned the validity of Dr. Salazar's findings at the time he 
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signed the report, does not establish that defendant was unable 
to confront the witness. Again, defendant was free to call Dr. 
Salazar to testify, but did not do so. His claim that he was 
denied confrontation is, therefore, baseless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's convictions and deny his request for a new 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _< day of December, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. S^OGkEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DAVID ANDREW MOOSMAN, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
CI^IL NO. 871003540 
THE SUPREME COURT pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Rules of 
Utah Supreme Court sent the above matter back to supplement the 
record for Findings. It appears that the record does not 
reflect the oral waiver of a jury trial at the time of trial. 
The Findings of this Court are that the Defendant was 
origionally arraigned and requested a jury trial, that a few 
days prior of the trial counsel for the Defendant contacted the 
Court's Secretary and stated that the Defendant was waiving a 
jury trial and to call off bringing in a panel; this was 
accomplished. On the morning of the trial the Court asked 
counsel for the Defendant if it was correct that the Defendant 
was waiving his trial by jury. Defense counsel responded in 
the affirmative. The Court then requested that Defendant, his 
counsel and County Attorney meet in chambers so the Court could 
be satisfied that the Defendant himself was electing to waive a 
jury trial. The Court does not remember if the Court Reporter 
was present during this meeting. The Court suspects that he 
was simply neglected to be told and his presence was over 
looked by everyone present. The Court then asked the Defendant 
Mr. Moosman if it was correct, as his counsel had stated, that 
it was his wish to waive a jury trial. He stated this was 
correct. He was then asked if he knew he had a right to a jury 
trial and he stated he did. He was then asked if he had 
discussed the ramifications or the strategy concerjQf$A3FR //y? 
FiLED 
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JH 
State of Utah vs. David Andrew Moosman 
Case No. 871003540 
Page 2 
with his attorney on the proper method to proceed without a 
jury. He again stated this was true and he fully understood 
what the waiver of a jury trial meant. The Court then 
reiterated he did have the right to a jury trial, but if he 
wished to waive the same he could do so and the County Attorney 
concurred in the waiver. The Court then proceeded to try the 
case without a jury. The trial started on June 1/ 1987 and 
concluded on June 16, 1987. At no time during this trial did 
counsel or the Defendant object or comment on the lack of 
presence of the jury. Sentencing was lield on June 29, 1987, 
again neither the Defendant or his counsel commented or 
objected to the fact that the Defendant was not tried by a 
jury. To this Court's recollection this is the correct record 
to conform to the truth pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
Dated this c^ !Jl__ day of October, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
IN IML , DISTRICT , VUU«« W «"t FIRST UUU1HAL D I S 1 CT 
IN 1HL COUNTY OF CACHE . STAU OF UTAH 
NOTICE OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT 
Pursuant to the authority of 78-3-24(J) and 78-3-28, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. Judge VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN has 
been appointed to temporarily serve as DISTRICT couRTJudge tor the 
date(s) of- OCTOBER 12
 f 19 89 and has the same powers as the 
Judge of the court. 
DATED THIS 13th DAY OF OCTOBER , 19 89 
YTM^^^^^^^^ 
TRIAL COURT EXECUTIVE 
cc: Assigned Judge 
State Court Administrator 
Court File 
Attorneys of Record 
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THE INSURANCE. I THINK THAT CRITICAL TO THIS CASE IN TERMS 
OF THE INTENTIONAL CRIMINAL ACT IS THE STEERING OF THE VEHI-
CLE AND THE CLUBBING IS CORROBORATIVE OF THAT INTENT TO KILL. 
I WOULD SUBMIT TO YOU, YOUR HONOR, THAT THE EVIDENC$ 
IS CLEAR BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DAVID MOOSMAN COM-
MITTED THE OFFENSES WITH WHICH HE HAS BEEN CHARGED AND AGAIN 
ASK. THE COURT TO FIND HIM GUILTY OF EACH OFFENSE. 
THE COURT: IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER, OF 
COURSE IT'S THE BURDEN OF THE STATE TO SHOW THEIR ALLEGATIONS 
AND EACH ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE TO BE PROVED BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT, A STANDARD OF PROOF WHICH HAS BEEN DEFINED 
SEVERAL WAYS, BUT IN ONE OF THE METHODS IN DESCRIBING WHAT 
THAT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD OF PROOF MUST BE IS 
THAT THERE MUST BE AN ABIDING CONVICTION OF THE TRUTH OF THE 
MATTER TO SHOW THAT IT'S BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. "ABIDING? 
COMING FROM THE WORD "ABODE," OF WHERE YOU LIVE, SOMETHING 
YOU HAVE TO LIVE WITH. THAT IS, THE FINDER OF THE FACT, BE 
IT A JURY, BE IT A COURT, THAT YOU MAKE YOUR FINDINGS BASED 
ON THE EVIDENCE AND THAT YOU FEEL THE EVIDENCE IS BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT AND THAT THIS IS EVIDENCE THAT IN YOUR FIND-
ING, IF IT'S BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, SOMETHING YOU CAN 
LIVE WITH, AND THAT'S THE STANDARD WE'RE BOUND BY. 
IN FINDING THAT, THIS CASE IS NOT THE KIND OF A 
CASE WHERE YOU HAVE WITNESSES TO WHAT HAPPENED, ONLY MR. MOOS-} 
MAN AND THE VICTIM ARE WITNESSES TO ALL THE FACTS. YOU HAVE 
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TO THEN FIND WHERE THE TRUTH IS. IT'S NOT THE TYPE OF CASE, 
AS I SAY, WHERE YOU HAVE WITNESSES WHERE YOU SEE SOMEBODY 
SHOOT SOMEBODY AND KILL THEM AND SAY, "YEAH, I SAW HIM TAKE 
THE GUN OUT, SHOOT, THE GUY'S DEAD." IT ISN'T THAT KIND OF A 
CASE AT ALL. IT'S THE KIND OF A CASE WHERE THERE ARE SEVERALl 
PIECES OF EVIDENCE, SOME OF LITTLE VALUE, SOME OF GREAT 
VALUE, AND IT'S IMPORTANT IN SORTING OUT THIS VALUE SYSTEM 
ON WHAT YOU ATTACH TO THE EVIDENCE AND THEN PLACE THE WHOLE 
THING TOGETHER IN SORT OF A MOSAIC AND SEE WHAT YOU COME UP 
WITH. 
FOR EXAMPLE, ALL THIS TESTIMONY ABOUT A MARITAL 
DISCORD HAPPENING AND OCCURRING TO SAY, "WELL, LOOK, THEY 
WERE FIGHTING ALL THE SUMMER BEFORE THIS AND DURING THIS, 
HAD ALL OF THESE DIFFICULTIES, THIS LOOKS LIKE A REASON WHY 
AND WOULD PROVIDE A REASON TO KILL HER." POSSIBLY, BUT NOT 
LIKELY. OR ELSE I WOULDN'T HAVE SOMEWHERE AROUND 400 DIVOR-
CES A YEAR WITHOUT 400 MURDERS TO GO WITH THEM. YOU DON'T 
JUST SAY BECAUSE OF MARITAL DISCORD SOMEBODY IS GOING TO KILL 
SOMEBODY. BUT YOU DO, AND I THINK IN A CONTEXT, LOOK AT IT 
AS MAYBE CORROBORATIVE OF SOME OTHER EVIDENCE THAT'S INTRO-
DUCED TO SHOW AT LEAST THIS, THAT A PERSON IN A POSITION 
WHERE THEY'RE ARGUING, FIGHTING, HITTING, MAY HAVE A DISPOSI-
TION TO COMMIT AN ACT OF THIS KIND AS OPPOSED TO ONE WHO'S 
DEEPLY IN LOVE WITH HIS WIFE AND HAVING NO PROBLEMS. SIMPLY 
A LITTLE BIT OF CORROBORATION. 
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1 AND IN LOOKING AT WHAT HAS BEEN TESTIFIED TO, 
2 FIRST OF ALL STATEMENTS BY TERRY CARLSEN MADE IN THIS COURT, 
3 I HIS STATEMENTS THAT THE DEFENDANT MADE MANY STATEMENTS TO HIM 
ON VARIOUS WAYS TO ELIMINATE HIS WIFE AND TO GET THE INSURANC 
MONEY, AND THAT HE HATED HIS WIFE. I THINK THAT PARTICULAR 
TESTIMONY I VIEW CERTAINLY WITH SOME CONCERN AS TO ITS--ALL 
7
 THE ACTUAL TRUTH. THERE'S BEEN NO IMPEACHMENT LAID AS TO 
8 
9 
THAT PARTICULAR TESTIMONY, IN ADDITION NO EVIDENCE THAT IS 
BROUGHT FORTH THAT HE TOLD THIS TO ANY OF HIS OTHER FRIENDS, 
10 I IF TERRY WAS HIS FRIEND. HE HAD OTHER FRIENDS; IF THAT'S 
11 THE KIND OF A PATTERN HE'S GOING TO TELL HIS FRIENDS ABOUT 
12 ELIMINATING HIS WIFE, WHY IS IT HE PICKS ONLY ON TERRY CARL-
13 I SEN? SO I DON'T THINK THERE'S TOO MUCH WEIGHT TO THAT. 
WE ALSO THEN HAVE THE TESTIMONY AND I THINK OF THE 
INSURANCE, THE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLAR INSURANCE POLICY IN 
JANUARY, SOME NINE MONTHS I GUESS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT, THE 
HUNDRED THOUSAND WITH BENEFICIAL, AND THEN THERE WAS THE 
OTHER ONE HE'D HAD THROUGH HIS SCHOOL, AND THE ONE THROUGH THE 
SCHOOL WOULD BE APPARENTLY THE KIND OF INSURANCE THAT YOU 
WOULD NORMALLY HAVE BECAUSE THE SCHOOL SORT OF GIVES THE 
BENEFIT. AND GETTING INSURANCE, A HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS, 
NINE MONTHS BEFORE AN ACCIDENT, WHILE WE ALL BUY INSURANCE, 
CERTAINLY IF THERE WAS A PLAN AND TO GAIN, TO ELIMINATE HIS 
WIFE, WITH SEVERAL FACTORS INVOLVED AS TO WHY HE WOULD, ONE 







































LOSS, ECONOMIC LOSS OF A DIVORCE, WITHOUT THE LOSS OF HIS 
CHILDREN, CERTAINLY TAKING OUT A HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLAR 
INSURANCE POLICY ADDS ANOTHER MOTIVE FOR WHY HE WOULD WANT 
TO ELIMINATE HIS WIFE AND WOULD CERTAINLY BE, I THINK, SOME 
CORROBORATION TOWARD THAT, BUT NOT CERTAINLY BY ITSELF, OR 
ALL OF US WHO GO OUT AND BUY AND GET OUR WIFE'S INSURANCE 
MAY BE IN JEOPARDY IF SOMETHING HAPPENS TO THEM. SO THAT IS 
NOT IN ITSELF BUT AGAIN IS SOME CORROBORATION. 
THEN WE HAVE SEVERAL WITNESSES--WELL, WE DID HAVE 
SOME FURTHER WITNESSES REGARDING INSURANCE, AND THAT'S THE 
CLAIMS THAT WERE MADE FOR THE INSURANCE AND EFFORTS TO GET 
IT RESOLVED AND ASKING FOR WITHIN A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE 
DEATH OF HIS WIFE. AGAIN, NOT CONCLUSIVE BUT SOME CORROBORA-
TION BACK TO MOTIVE AGAIN. 
THEN THERE'S THE TESTIMONY FROM THE GROUP OF WIT-
NESSES THAT WE HAD, THEIR CO-WORKERS, TENANTS, THE DOCTOR 
SHE WORKED FOR, SO FORTH, AS TO THE INJURIES THAT SHE HAD 
SUFFERED IN WHATEVER QUARRELS THAT MAY HAVE OCCURRED IN THIS 
MARITAL DISPUTE. AGAIN THIS JUST SUBSTANTIATES THE MARITAL 
DISPUTE BUT IS CERTAINLY NOT CONCLUSIVE OF SUFFICIENT MOTIVE 
BY ITSELF. 
NOW--AND THAT GOES TO SEVERAL WITNESSES DOWN TO 
EVEN THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS, ATTORNEYS, THE DIRECTOR OF CAPSA, 
AGAIN SHOWING THAT THIS SITUATION EXISTS. CERTAINLY NOT 
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CORROBORATION AS TO A PROPENSITY OR AN ADDITIONAL MOTIVE BE-
SIDES THE INSURANCE, THE MONEY THAT THE INSURANCE WOULD BRINGL 
THE PROPERTY HE WOULD GAIN WITHOUT LITIGATION, AND THE CUS-
TODY OF THE CHILDREN. AGAIN, BUT DOESN'T PROVE THE MURDER 
BUT DOES PROVIDE CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE AS TO MOTIVE AND 
REASON TO DO SO. 
THEN WE HAVE THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES UP AT 
THE SCENE WHERE THE ACCIDENT HAPPENED. MR. LUTZ, WHO PASSED 
THE CURVE AND SAID HE DIDN'T SEE ANY LIGHTS IN THE AREA ABOUT 
8:30, 8:45; AND I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT ADDS MUCH TO ANY SOLU-
TION TO THE QUESTION AT ALL. AND ALSO GLAYDE ERICKSON, WHO 
SAID HE YELLED DOWN AND DIDN'T GET AN ANSWER AND DECIDED HE 
DIDN'T WANT TO GO DOWN BECAUSE OF THE DARKNESS AND WAS GOING 
TO GARDEN CITY TO REPORT IT. THIS SHOWS, I THINK, ONLY THAT 
AT THIS TIME, ABOUT 10:15, THAT SOMEWHERE DOWN AT THE RIVER 
THERE WAS A CAR DOWN THERE WITH HEADLIGHTS ON. I DON'T THINK 
IT SHOWS MUCH MORE THAN THAT. 
THEN WE HAVE LARRY LARSEN, THE NEXT ONE ALONG, WHO 
ACTUALLY FINDS MR. MOOSMAN, WHO IS NOW UP AT THE SIDE OF THE 
ROAD, AND HAD SEEN MR. MOOSMAN AND WHO SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD 
HIM HE NEEDED HELP. HE OBSERVED THE CONDITION OF HIS CLOTH-
ING AND HIS OUTWARDLY APPEARANCE OF SCRATCHES AND SOME TORN 
CLOTHING; AND ON THE BASIS OF THIS REQUEST--AND HE FROM THAT 
POINT COULD ALSO SEE THE LIGHTS AND THE LOCATION OF WHERE THE 



























VEHICLE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RIVER, AND ON ITS SIDE BEHIND 
HIM OR ON ITS SIDE, AND RIGHT THEN COMING FOLLOWING BEHIND 
HIM WAS I THINK THE FELLOW'S NAME WAS LANNY WHO WAS WITH HIM 
AND DR. MALAN I BELIEVE IS HIS NAME, WHO WAS ANOTHER PERSON 
WHO STOPPED AND SEPARATED BUT MR. LARSEN FOUND THE BODY DOWN-
STREAM FROM THE CAR AND CALLED TO HIM AND THEY ALL CAME AND 
THEY HELPED MOVE THE BODY OUT OF THE STREAM AND PLACE IT ON 
THE BANK UNTIL THEY GOT FURTHER HELP AFTER THEY HEARD THE 
SIRENS COMING UP AND SO FORTH AND THE NECESSARY PARAPHERNALIA 
TO GET THE BODY UP TO THE TOP. 
AND ALSO MR. LARSEN SAID THAT WHEN HE FIRST SAW 
MR. MOOSMAN THERE THAT HIS--THAT HE WAS AS FAR AS HIS MANNER 
WAS CONCERNED THAT HE WAS UPSET WHEN HE FlftST SAW HIM AND 
THAT FOR SOME REASON HE THEN TOOK ACTION TO GO DOWN AND 
DISCOVER AND SEE WHAT HAPPENED. 
NOW, ALSO RANDY EINZINGER, THE PARAMEDIC, ARRIVED 
ABOUT ELEVEN O'CLOCK AND SAW THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS WHAT HE 
DESCRIBED AS IN A CONSCIOUS CONDITION, NO SERIOUS INJURIES, 
HE SAID APPEARED TO BE SHOCKY WAS HIS WORDS, BUT AFTER HE 
MADE FURTHER EXAMINATION FOUND NO PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCK BUT 
THAT HE WAS UPSET, AND THEN TOOK THE DEFENDANT TO THE HOSPITALJ 
WHERE HE FOUND MINOR ABRASIONS AND MINOR LACERATIONS. 
AND IT WAS UP WHILE THE DEFENDANT WAS IN THE AMBU-
LANCE THAT HE WAS TOLD LATER AT THAT TIME THAT HIS WIFE WAS 
DEAD, AND TESTIFIED HIS REACTION AS HE WAS TOLD THEN THAT HE 
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COULDN'T BELIEVE IT, THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING TO HER WHEN HE 
LEFT HER, SHE WAS ALL RIGHT, AND STATED THAT--AGAIN HE MAKES 
THESE STATEMENTS HE KILLED HIS WIFE AND GIVES THE IMPRESSION 
TO PEOPLE HE TELLS THIS TO THAT HE KILLED HIS WIFE NOT AS A 
DELIBERATE, PREMEDITATED ACT BUT AS A RESULT OF HIM BEING 
THE DRIVER OF THE CAR AND CAUSING HER DEATH AND THAT SHE WAS 
DEAD. 
AND IT IS AT THIS POINT WHERE HE DOES STATE THAT 
"WE WERE HAVING A FIGHT, YOU KNOW, AND I WISH SHE WERE DEAD." 
THAT 
WHAT/MAY MEAN IN HIS MIND I DON'T KNOW. 
I THINK SOME MORE IMPORTANT EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
OBSERVATIONS OF THE DEFENDANT AND HIS REACTIONS COME AT THE 
EMERGENCY ROOM FROM PEGGY WOLFLEY AND DR. BISHOP, WHERE THEY 
HAVE HAD, BOTH, YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM IN 
SEEING CONDITIONS OF THIS KIND, AND THAT SHE FELT IN VIEWING 
THESE KIND OF THINGS THAT THE ATTITUDE, RESPONSES OF THE 
DEFENDANT WERE UNUSUAL FOR THIS KIND OF A SITUATION THAT SHE 
HAD BEEN USED TO SEEING. 
AGAIN, YOU DON'T CONVICT SOMEBODY BECAUSE SOMEBODY 
FEELS AFTER EXPERIENCE THAT THEIR RESPONSES ARE UNUSUAL, BUT 
AGAIN I THINK THIS IS CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE IN THE WHOLE 
MOSAIC THAT I'VE SAID AS LENDING SOME CORROBORATION TO WHAT 
HAS HAPPENED. 
ALSO DR. BISHOP'S THOUGHTS AND HIS CONTACTS WITH 



























WAS IN HIS WORDS THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING AMISS IN THIS CASE. 
"THIS IS SOMETHING I HAVEN'T SEEN IN THIS TYPE OF CONDUCT UN-
DER THESE KIND OF CIRCUMSTANCES, WHERE A PERSON HAS BEEN IN 
AN ACCIDENT AND BEEN INFORMED THAT A PERSON'S CLOSEST, LIKE 
THEIR WIFE, HAS BEEN KILLED." AND ON EXAMINATION HIS STATE-
MENT WAS THAT HE HAD NEVER SEEN A PERSON RESPOND AS THE 
DEFENDANT DID ON THE DEATH OF HIS WIFE AND THAT HE WANTED TO 
LEAVE THE HOSPITAL AS SOON AS HE GOT THERjE. 
NOW SOME OTHER TESTIMONY GIVEN BY DR. BISHOP, AND 
THAT IS THE PHYSICAL APPEARANCE OF THE DEFENDANT AS TO HIS 
CLOTHING, THAT HIS SHOES APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN WET BUT THAT 
THE REST OF HIS CLOTHING APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN, IN HIS WORDS, 
DUSTED WITH LIKE A DRY POWDERY EARTH DUST. HE EVEN USED LIKE 
DUSTED WITH FLOUR, I BELIEVE, BUT WAS, OF COURSE, NOT FLOUR 
BUT WAS A VERY DUSTY SURFACE ON HIS OUTER CLOTHING, WHICH 
WOULD SEEM INCONSISTENT WITH THE DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY THAT 
HIS WADING UP AND DOWN THE RIVER TO GET OUT AND FINDING A WAY 
TO GET OUT, THAT HE'D COME UP TO CHEST LEVEL IN THE WATER, 
WHICH WOULD MAKE ALL OF HIS CLOTHES WET, AND AS HE CLIMBED 
BACK UP WITH WET CLOTHING YOU'D HAVE THEM APPEAR MORE TO BE 
MUDDY THAN YOU WOULD TO HAVE THEM DUSTED OVER WITH DRY DUST 
LIKE YOU WOULD GET WHEN YOU FIRST WENT OFF OUT OF THE CAR. 
AND ALSO I THINK ON CROSS EXAMINATION DR. BISHOP'S 
STATEMENT TO COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT THAT AGAIN THE DEFEN-
DANT'S REACTIONS WERE NOT APPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
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FOR IT BEING AN ACCIDENTAL DEATH. SUFFICIENT TO AROUSE DR. 
BISHOP TO REPORT IT TO THE AUTHORITIES. AGAIN, NOT CONCLU-
SIVE BUT CORROBORATIVE. 
THEN WE HAVE LARRY FORSGREN, THE UTAH HIGHWAY 
PATROL, WHO WAS THE INVESTIGATOR AT THE SCENE, AND IN CON-
JUNCTION OF WHAT HIS STORY WAS WITH THE DEFENDANT UPSET AND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD TOLD HIM ABOUT HIS GOING DOWN, HELPED 
8 I HIS WIFE OUT OF THE CAR, THAT SHE WAS OKAY AND HE LEFT HER 
9 | SITTING ON THE BANK AND THEN WENT TO GET HELP, FEELING THAT 
10 J THE MOST--THAT WOULD BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE ACTION TO TAKE, 
11 AND GOT UP AND TRAFFIC WOULDN'T STOP AND HE THREW ROCKS TO 
12 TRY AND STOP BUT WOULDN'T STOP, UNTIL FINALLY I GUESS LARRY 
13 LARSEN I BELIEVE HIS NAME WAS, THE FIRST ONE THAT FINALLY GOTj 
14 | STOPPED. AGAIN WE GET THIS REPETITION OF AFTER HE FINDS 
15 OUT OR IS TOLD HIS WIFE WAS DEAD HE SAYS, "I KILLED MY WIFE/1 
16 AND ASKED HIM WHAT HAPPENED AND HE SAYS HE DIDN'T REMEMBER. 
17 AND ALSO IN A THIRD CONVERSATION SAID WELL, MAYBE HE MUST 
18 HAVE GONE TO SLEEP AND THAT SHE SCREAMED AND HE WAS THROWN 
19 OUT OF THE VEHICLE AND BOUNCED, IN HIS WORDS, DOWN THE HILL, 
20 OUT OF THE DRIVER'S SIDE, AND THEN AFTER, OF COURSE, HIM 
21 COMING TO A STOP, WENT DOWN TO THE RIVER TO SEE WHAT HAP-
22 PENED TO HIS WIFE. 
23 THEN WE HAVE THE TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE RECON-
24 STRUCTION, PARTICIPATION OF THE TROOPER AND ALSO ROBERT 

















ACCURATE SPEED BECAUSE OF THE LENGTH OF 
WITH A SPEED, AND 
DISTANCE THE CAR 
THE SCUFF MARK, OF 
HE USED TWO METHODS. ONE 
WOULD GO AND DROP, AND 
BETWEEN 27 AND 22 MILES 
THINK THAT IS SIGNIFICANT. THAT'S A FAIRLY 
OF SPEED TO BE GOING DOWN THE DUGWAY EVEN AT NIGHT 
BY ANY ORDINARY 
THEN HIS 
TRAFFIC THAT GOES GENERALLY DOWN THERE, AND 
TESTIMONY IS FROM HIS FINDINGS THAT THERE HAD TO BE 
A QUICK CHANGE OF DIRECTION, THAT 
TOWARD THE RIGHT 
1 HOUR AND TURNED 
THE VEHICLE TURNED RAPIDLY 
AT BETWEEN THE SPEED OF 27 AND 22 MILES PER 
ABRUPTLY TO THE RIGHT, CONSISTENT WITH ONE 
INTENTIONALLY RAPIDLY TURNING THE STEERING WHEEL ABRUPTLY TO 
THE RIGHT. THAT WAS DAHLE'S FINDINGS AFTER HIS LOOKING AT 
THE SCUFF MARKS AND THE OTHERS SIGNS ON THE ROADWAY THAT HE 
FOUND. 
THERE WAS SOME, AND ESPECIALLY ON CROSS EXAMINA-
TION AND SOME ON REDIRECT, ABOUT HOW FAR UP THE ROAD AND 
WHAT LANE YOU'D BE IN TO DO IT, BUT I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT'S 
PARTICULARLY RELEVANT OR TELLS US THAT MUCH EVEN IF YOU KNEW. 
EXCEPT THAT IT MIGHT GIVE YOU SOME REACTION TIME IF YOU COULD 
FIGURE THAT OUT IN WHICH YOU HAD TIME TO MAKE A CORRECTION, 
AND THAT THERE WAS SOME RIGHT AT THE END AS THE WHEELS JUST 
PRIOR TO LEAVING THE SHOULDER OF THE ROAD, EVIDENCE OF SOME 
CORRECTION IN WHICH HE STATED THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN INTEN-





 WHEEL. IN HIS OPINION, IN HIS OBSERVATIONS OF IT, THAT IT 
2 WAS MORE LIKELY OF JUST LETTING GO OF THE STEERING WHEEL. 
3
 JUST AS THE CAR LEFT THE ROAD. AND THIS TO ME IS REALLY ONE 
4
 OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE CASE AS FAR AS THE PHYSI-
5
 I CAL EVIDENCE IS CONCERNED, OF HAVING EVIDENCE OF ABRUPTLY--
SOMEONE ABRUPTLY TURNING THE CAR TO THE RIGHT OFF A CLIFF, 
OR NOT AN UP-AND-DOWN CLIFF BUT CERTAINLY A VERY STEEP IN-
CLINE, FULL OF BOULDERS AND THE WHOLE THING 300 FEET DOWN 
• I TO THE RIVER AT ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS PARTS IN LOGAN 
10 CANYON, AT A POINT CONVENIENTLY JUST PAST THE GUARDRAIL, AT 
11 I A POINT WHERE AN EXIT COULD BE MADE IF YOU DO IT QUICKLY 
ENOUGH JUST AS THE CAR TURNS, IN WHICH YOU MIGHT LET GO OF 
THE STEERING WHEEL JUST AS IT EXISTED OFF THE SHOULDER OF 
THE ROAD, WOULD SHOW TO ME AN INTENTIONAL PART ON THE PART 
OF THE DRIVER OF RUNNING THE CAR OFF THE ROAD WITH THE PASSEN*-
GER IN IT WITH AN ESCAPE ROUTE FOR HIMSELFJ 
NOW WE GET DOWN TO THE PLACE WHERE THE CAR CAME TO 
REST. THE DEFENDANT SAYS HE WENT DOWN, FOUND HIS WIFE ALIVE, 
HELPED HER OUT, SET HER ON THE BANK, DECIDED TO GO FOR HELP, 
WHEN THEY GOT BACK SHE'S FOUND OUT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RIVER 
HELD UP ON A ROCK, DEAD. 
JAMES TULLIS, THE CIVIL ENGINEER, I DON'T THINK 
GAVE US TOO MUCH EXCEPT TO SHOW US WHAT THE GENERAL FLOW OF 
THE WATER IS AT CERTAIN PLACES IN THE STREAM AND WHAT THE 
















BODY WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STREAM AT A PORTION WHERE THE 
FLOW OF THE WATER COULD HAVE CARRIED IT THERE FROM THE TRUCK. 
I THINK ALSO IMPORTANT IS THAT THE POSITION WHERE 
THE BODY WAS FOUND OUT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STREAM, NOT IN 
THE SHALLOW PORTION NEXT TO THE BANK WHERE THE DEFENDANT 
SAID HE LEFT HIS WIFE WHEN HE WENT FOR HELP, AND ALSO TESTI-
MONY AS TO THE LACK OF BLOOD IN THE CAR CONSIDERING THE LATER) 
TESTIMONY OF THE SCALP WOUNDS, BLEEDING PROFUSELY. IF THESE 
HAD OCCURRED IN THE CAR GOING DOWN THE HILL, TUMBLING OVER, 
ROLLING, ACCELERATING, HITTING BIG ROCKS, FINALLY TURNING 
OVER ON ITS SIDE IN THE RIVER, I THINK THAT AS DR. WALLACE 
SAYS THESE ARE THE KIND OF WOUNDS THAT WOULD HAVE PROFUSE 
BLEEDING FROM THE SCALP IF ALIVE, AND THAT HIS WORDS HE FELT 
IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE SEAT COVERS AND SO FORTH, THAT 
PART OF THE CAR, THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A LOT OF BLOOD 
ON THAT KIND OF MATERIAL IN THE CAR, AND THERE APPARENTLY WAS 
NOT. 
DR. SWEENEY'S TESTIMONY, THE MEDICAL EXAMINER, 
STATED THAT HE FELT THAT THE WOUNDS WERE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD 
OF THEM BEING CAUSED BY THE ACCIDENT ITSELF, LITTLE LIKELI-
HOOD THAT THEY WERE CAUSED BY THE ACTION OF A BODY ROLLING 
OVER IN THE STREAM ON THE ROCKS, BUT WAS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT 
WITH BEING STRUCK BY A BLUNT INSTRUMENT. 
THIS IS DISPUTED MOSTLY BY DR. MOORE IN HIS STAT-
ING THAT THE BLOWS WERE CONSISTENT AND THAT HE COULD TELL THE 
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1 DIFFERENCE OF WHETHER THE IMPELLING FORCE CAME FROM THE BODY 
2 OR WHETHER IT WAS FROM AN OUTSIDE FORCE IMPELLED AGAINST THE 
3 BODY. THIS IS DIRECTLY DISPUTED BY DR. SWEENEY AS NOT EVEN 
4 A POSSIBILITY. YOU GOT TO KNOW WHETHER THERE'S DAMAGE TO 
5 THE BRAIN BEFORE YOU CAN TELL THAT OR NOT. I FEEL THAT THE 
6 ADVANTAGE, OF COURSE, OF KNOWING WHAT THE FACTS ARE ARE WITH 
7 DR. SWEENEY. HE WAS THE ONE THERE AT THE TIME WHEN THE 
8 AUTOPSY WAS STARTED, HE STATED HE SAW WHAT THE EXTERIOR AT 
9 LEAST; THAT HE DID LEAVE DURING THE PORTION OF THE AUTOPSY, 
10 IN AND OUT WHEN THE INTERIOR PORTION OF THE BODY WAS BEING 
ft AUTOPSIED, AND ALSO I BELIEVE HE STATED THAT THERE WAS, OF 
12 COURSE, SOME THINGS HE DIDN'T REMEMBER- WHETHER HE WAS THERE 
13 OR NOT AND THAT THE TIME OF TAKING THE PHOTOGRAPHS HE DOESN'T 
14 REMEMBER WHETHER HE WAS PRESENT THEN OR NOT, OR AT THE TIME 
15 THAT--I BELIEVE HIS TESTIMONY WAS THAT HE WASN'T WHEN HE RE-
16 DUCED THE SCALP, BUT THAT HE DID HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY ON THE 
17 EXAMINATION OF THE EXTERIOR OF THE BODY, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE 
18 THE LACERATION, HE DID HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF SEEING THEM 
19 PRIOR TO THE AUTOPSY ITSELF, AND HE HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF SEE-
20 ING IT AS IT EXISTED AND NOT JUST FROM PHOTOGRAPHS. I THINK 
21 THAT'S IMPORTANT. 
22 I ALSO THINK THAT HE HAD AN ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE IN 
23 THAT HE WAS CONSULTING DURING THE AUTOPSY WITH DR. SALAZAR, 
24 WHO WAS PERFORMING THE MAJOR PORTION OF IT. HE HAD THE ADVAN-f 
25 TAGE NOT ONLY OF THIS CONSULTATION WHEN HE'S GOING IN AND OUT! 
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WITH HIM, AS TO WHAT'S GOING ON, BUT THAT AFTERWARDS, IMMED-
IATELY AFTERWARDS, IN WRITING UP, DR. SALAZAR WRITING UP THE 
REPORT, BOTH IN ITS HANDWRITING AND IN THE LATER TYPEWRITTEN 
ONE, CONSULTED TOGETHER AS TO WHAT THE FINDINGS WERE FOR 
THIS AUTOPSY AND HAD TO BE OKAYED BY DR. SWEENEY AS THE HEAD 
MEDICAL EXAMINER AS TO WHAT THESE FINDINGS WERE, AND SO I 
THINK THAT CERTAINLY FAR MORE WEIGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HIS 
TESTIMONY THAN DR. MOORE'S, AND SO--AND DR. WALLACE FELT 
THAT THE INJURIES WERE MADE BY AN INSTRUMENT WITH AN EDGE ON 
IT RATHER THAN AS OPPOSED TO A BLUNT OBJECT, AND THAT CER-
TAINLY THE REFLECTION OF THE SCALP MAY HAVE WIDENED THE 
WOUNDS AS HE OBSERVED FROM HIS PAST OBSERVATIONS, ALTHOUGH, 
OF COURSE, HE DIDN'T KNOW HERE BECAUSE HE WASN'T THERE, AND 
THAT THERE WOULD BE PROFUSE BLEEDING FROM THE SCALP FROM THE 
TYPE OF WOUNDS THAT WERE THERE AND THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN SOME BLOOD IN THE CAR, AND ESPECIALLY ON THOSE TYPES OF 
MATERIALS SUCH AS THE SEAT COVER THAT WOULD ABSORB IT. 
SO I FEEL THAT WITH ALL OF THIS AND THE ILLOGIC OF 
THE VICTIM BEING TAKEN OUT OF THE CAR AND SET ON THE BANK 
AND HER HUSBAND LEAVING AND THEN LATER FOUND OUT IN THE MID-
DLE OF THE RIVER IS NOT LOGICAL AND DOESN'T SUPPORT THE 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT. 
I FEEL THAT BECAUSE OF WHAT I FIND TO BE AN INTEN-
TIONAL ACT OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE OF GOING 



























OFF THE ROAD INTO AN AREA THAT OFFERS HIM THE LEAST RISK--
IT'S PRETTY RISKY, I WOULDN'T DO IT—BUT CERTAINLY AT THE 
LEAST RISKY AND AT A POINT IN LOGAN CANYON WHERE IT OCCURRED, 
ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACES TO GO OFF, AND CONVENIENTLY 
AFTER YOU PASS THE GUARDRAIL NOT TO STOP, THAT THIS WAS, 
I FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, WAS AN INTENTIONAL ACT ON 
HIS PART, WAS PREMEDITATED; THAT HE HAD PLENTY OF OPPORTUNITY 
i 
TO EXAMINE ALL OF LOGAN CANYON SEVERAL TIMES TO FIND OUT 
WHERE IT WOULD BE; THAT HE HAD THE MOTIVES OF CERTAINLY PROB-
LEMS WITH HIS WIFE; CERTAINLY TO OBTAIN INSURANCE, CERTAINLY 
TO OBTAIN THE PROPERTY WITHOUT DIFFICULTY IF HE WAS SUCCESS-
FUL IN WHAT HE WANTED TO DO; CUSTODY OF HIS CHILDREN, ALL OF 
THOSE THINGS THAT HE WANTED. 
AND ALSO I FIND THAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS TO ME 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE INITIAL ATTEMPT IN RUNNING 
HER OFF DOWN OVER 300 FEET WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL, THAT THE INJUR 
IES WERE NOT FATAL; THAT HE DID REACH THE CAR, AND THAT I 
FIND IT INCONSISTENT THAT HE MOVED HER TO A BANK AND SHE 
LATER GOT OUT INTO THE RIVER, AND IT'S NOT LOGICAL AND IT'S 
MUCH MORE LOGICAL THAT IF YOU RUN SOMEBODY OFF A CLIFF INTEN-
TIONALLY THAT YOU DON'T THEN SAVE THEM, THAT YOU DO SOMETHING 
TO FINISH THE JOB, WHETHER HE DID IT WITH EXHIBIT 30 OR SOME 
OTHER BLUNT OBJECT, EVEN THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN SHARP, AS DR. 
WALLACE SAYS; I DON'T KNOW; BUT THAT IT WAS WITH SOME SORT OF 
AN INSTRUMENT THAT WOULD CAUSE THE KIND OF LACERATIONS ON THE 
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SCALP THAT OCCURRED; AND THAT THE REASON THERE WAS NO BLOOD 
IN THE CAR IS THAT SHE WAS AT LEAST PARTIALLY OUT OF THE CAR, 
HANGING OUT WITH THE CAR ON ITS SIDE AND A LOT OF BLOOD COM-
ING OUT OF THE WOUNDS GOES INTO THE WATER; THAT HE THEN EXIT-
ED THE BODY, CONSCIOUS OR DAZED OR WHATEVER SHAPE, AND 
WHETHER HE PUT HIS FOOT ON HER AND INTENTIONALLY DROWNED 
HER I DON'T KNOW, OR WHETHER HE JUST LET HER FLOAT DOWN IN 
THAT KIND OF A CONDITION AND SHE DROWN GOING DOWN THE STREAM; 
AND I FIND THAT HE DID THAT AND THAT HE DID SO INTENTIONALLY; 
THAT HE DID SO FOR MORE THAN ONE FACTOR, BUT ONE OF THE MAJOR, 
FACTORS BEING PECUNIARY GAIN; AND SO I FIND THE DEFENDANT 
GUILTY ON COUNT ONE; AND THAT ALSO BASED UPON THE EXHIBITS 
OF MAKING THE CLAIMS FOR THE MONEY, GUILTY ON COUNT TWO AND 
THREE. 
1, THEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THAT FINDING, WITHDRAW 
THE BOND AND WE'LL SET A TIME MUTUALLY CONVENIENT FOR BOTH 
PARTIES FOR A HEARING ON THE SECOND PHASE, OF SENTENCING. 
MR. MOOSMAN CSHOUTING): YOU'RE WRONG. YOU'RE 
WRONG. I SWEAR IT. THEIR PEOPLE WERE THERE. THEY COULD 
TAKE THEIR--THEY COULD HAVE THEIR OWN VIEW. MY PEOPLE WEREN' 
THE COURT: MR. MOOSMAN, I'M SORRY TOO, AND--
MR. MOOSMAN: BUT YOU'RE WRONG. YOU'RE DESTROYING 
MY LIFE. DO YOU CARE? 
MR. LARSON: OKAY, COME ON. LET'S GO. 
(THE DEFENDANT WAS REMOVED FROM THE COURTROOM.b 
